Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers

Episode von Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03 von Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München · 1. September 2006

This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is interpreted as a social norm for tax compliance. The norm strength, depending on the share of evaders in the society, is endogenously derived. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative, as their evasion decision depends on the other agents' compliance. We characterize an equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the impact of tax and deterrence policies on compliance. Our analysis is then extended to the case of a society which consists of heterogenous communities where individual evasion decisions are embedded in a complex social structure. In this scenario, behavior is crucially influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we discuss the role of belief management and belief leadership as alternative policy tools.

Weitere Episoden von „Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03“

• Social Norms and the Evolution of Conditional Cooperation 1. März 2007
• An Empirical Test of the Reder Hypothesis 1. März 2007
• Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay? 1. März 2007
• The Relationship Between Risk Attitudes and Heuristics in Search Tasks: A Laboratory Experiment 1. Februar 2007
• Can Opacity of a Credible Central Bank Explain Excessive Inflation? 1. Februar 2007
• The Impact of Naïve Advice and Observational Learning in Beauty-contest Games 24. Januar 2007
• Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment 1. Januar 2007
• Default Rates in the Loan Market for SMEs 1. Januar 2007
• Best Responding to What? A Behavioral Approach to One Shot Play in 2x2 Games 1. Januar 2007
• Conditional cooperation on three continents 1. Januar 2007
• Spatial Convergence in Height in East-Central Europe, 1890-1910 1. Januar 2007
• Central Bank's Action and Communication 1. Januar 2007
• Adding a Stick to the Carrot? The Interaction of Bonuses and Fines 1. Januar 2007
• Education, Dynamic Signaling and Social Distance 1. Januar 2007
• Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic History 1. Januar 2007

Alle Episoden von Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03 · Mehr Bildung-Podcasts