Fragmented property rights and R&D competition

Episode von Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03 von Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München · 1. Juni 2006

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies multiple simultaneous R&D contests for complementary patents and how they interact with patent portfolios that firms may have acquired already. We also consider how this interaction and the intensity of the contests depends on the type of patent trade regimes and the product market equilibria that result from these regimes. We solve for the contest equilibria and show that the multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that considerably reduces the overall contest effort.

Weitere Episoden von „Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03“

Alle Episoden von Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03 · Mehr Bildung-Podcasts